Abstract. In the Minority, Majority and Dollar Games (MG, MAJG, $G) agents compete for rewards, acting in accord with the previously best-performing of their strategies. Different aspects/kinds of realworld markets are modelled by these games. In the MG, agents compete for scarce resources; in the MAJG agents imitate the group to exploit a trend; in the $G agents attempt to predict and benefit both from trends and changes in the direction of a market. It has been previously shown that in the MG for a reasonable number of preliminary time steps preceding equilibrium (Time Horizon MG, THMG), agents' attempt to optimize their gains by active strategy selection is "illusory": the hypothetical gains of their strategies is greater on average than agents' actual average gains. Furthermore, if a small proportion of agents deliberately choose and act in accord with their seemingly worst performing strategy, these outperform all other agents on average, and even attain mean positive gain, otherwise rare for agents in the MG. This latter phenomenon raises the question as to how well the optimization procedure works in the THMAJG and TH$G. We demonstrate that the illusion of control is absent in THMAJG and TH$G. This provides further clarification of the kinds of situations subject to genuine control, and those not, in set-ups a priori defined to emphasize the importance of optimization.
Introduction
"Illusion of control" [1] describes the fact that individuals appear hard-wired to over-attribute success to skill, and to underestimate the role of chance, when both are in fact present. We have previously shown [2] that in one of the most extensively-studied agent-based game-models of markets, the minority game (MG), agents' control is illusory in the following sense: the mean actual performance of all agents averaged over many different initial conditions is poorer than the mean hypothetical performance of all their given strategies. The finding is striking because at each time-step agents deploy that strategy with the best hypothetical performance. This finding is most generally true under the following conditions: the initial state is iterated for a "reasonable" number of time-steps ( 2000 say) short of equilibrium ( 5000 say) at which point a rolling window of cumulative strategy scores is maintained, which window distinguishes the Time Horizon MG (THMG) from the MG proper. In the THMG, the illusion is observed for all m (m is the number of bits of binary history in agents' memory and an "m-bit history" consists of a string of 1's and 0's of length m. 1 indicates a e-mail: jsatinover@ethz.ch b e-mail: dsornette@ethz.ch that a minority of agents have adopted action "−1", 0 indicates that they have adopted action "+1"). The finding is less generally true in the MG strictly speaking, in which the system is always allowed to run to equilibrium. In that case, it is true for all m, except at the so-called critical point α c = However, equilibrium in the MG proper is only reached after ∼100 × 2 m+1 iterations away from α c and orders or magnitude more near α c , therefore for N = 31 at m c = 4, t eq 3200 iterations. Arguably, no real-world market is sufficiently stationary to attain such an equilibrium state.
Another important finding presented in [2] is the surprising fact that, if a small proportion of agents ( 0.15, e.g., 3 of 31) deploy their previously worst performing strategy, these on average outperform all others. In fact they relatively consistently attain average net positive gain, otherwise rare in the MG as the mean gain for both strategies and agents is in general negative due to the minority rule. Note that such an inversion of the selection rule is a symmetric alteration with no privileging nor increase in agent computational capacity (see Appendix).
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The success of "anti-optimizing" agents is a further marker of the "illusory" nature of the standard optimization rule. It also raises the following question: is an inverted rule equivalent to agents playing a Majority Game (MAJG)? As they are not optimizing to be in the minority, it seems that agents must be optimizing to be in the majority, but failing, and rather inadvertently succeed in finding the minority remarkably often. By this reasoning it seems to follow that in a game where all agents are striving to be in the majority (MAJG), select agents that optimize instead to be in the minority will likewise succeed disproportionately. Does the MAJG thus also demonstrate an "illusion of control"? Since agent gain in the $G also follows a majority rule, albeit time-lagged, would "illusion of control" be found in it, too?
The goal of the present paper is to clarify these questions and demonstrate that agents who invert their optimization rule in the MG are not actually playing a MAJG and that no illusion of control is found in either the MAJG or the $G. We discuss our results in terms of persistent versus anti-persistent characteristics of the time series generated by the various models. In a follow-up to this paper [3], we relate these comparative results to different characteristics of markets -or different phases they may enter -as real-world agents alter their game-playing behavior.
Our main result with respect to the THMG is detailed in [2] and Section 1. above: strategies' mean hypothetical performance exceeds agents' mean actual performance. Agents should thus behave in risk-averse fashion by switching randomly between strategies rather than optimizing. Two conditions must hold for the statement to be false: (1) m m c ; (2) the system must be allowed to reach equilibrium (t τ eq ). Condition (2) requires an exceedingly large number of preliminary steps before agent selection begins, and orders of magnitude more steps if m ≈ m c ). In the MG proper the situation is more complex and is discussed at length in [2] .
In the MAJG and $G the reverse holds: optimization greatly enhances agent over strategy gain, both being positive.
We first briefly review the formal structure of each of the MG, MAJG and $G. We then present the results of extensive numerical simulations. Finally we discuss the differences that emerge in terms of persistent versus antipersistent time-series.
Minority, Majority and $ Games

Definition and overview of Minority Games (MG) and Time-Horizon MG (THMG)
In the MG, those agents gain whose actions are in the minority subset at each time-step. Agents in the complementary (majority) subset lose. As discussed in [2], the MG is an agent-based model of financial markets that violates the "rational expectations" assumption of standard economic theory [4] : when every agent behaves in accord with its most rational expectation, the collective action of all agents makes the expectation false. Common expectations cancel, leading to anti-persistent behavior both for the collective and for individuals [5, 6] .
In brief, the MG proceeds as follows: at each time step t, each agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} chooses one of two alternative actions a i (t) ∈ {−1, 1}. This yields a value maps μ(t) → a i (t). Strategies accumulate +1 hypothetical point each time they win, unboundedly, and -1 hypothetical point each time they lose. Agents whose strategies lead to a win accumulate +1 real point, and those that lose accumulate -1 point. A running score table is kept for every strategy and agent. The strategy chosen by each agent at t is the one which would have been in the minority most frequently until then. This is the key optimization step. If an agent's best strategy predicts D(t) = 1 (resp. 0), she will take the action -1 (resp. +1) to try to be in the minority. Ties are broken by a fair coin toss. If hypothetical points are summed over a rolling window of bounded length τ up to the last information available at t, the game is the "Time Horizon MG". For τ τ eq , the THMG is equivalent to the MG, where τ eq is the equilibrium time for the MG.
The distinguishing characteristic of the MG is the corresponding instantaneous payoff of agent I, given by −a i (t)A(t) -the minus sign encodes the minority rule (and similarly for each strategy for which it is added to the τ − 1 previous payoffs. The payoff may also be −Sgn[a i (t)A(t)] = −a i (t)D(t). This does not alter the dynamics of the game. If −a i (t)A(t) < 0 ⇒ −Sgn[a i (t)A(t)] < 0, agent i is rewarded. Agents in the MG and THMG thus try to be anti-imitative. For a range of m (given N , S), agent performance is better than what strategy performance would be in a game with no agents optimizing, assuming that the system is first allowed to reach equilibrium [5] . The phenomenon discussed in [2] is that when optimizing, and averaged over all actual agents and their component strategies in a given realization, and then averaged over many such initial quenched disorder states, agents in the TH variant of the MG nonetheless underperform the mean of their own measured strategy performance and do so for reasonable lengths of τ at all m. (In the MG, the same statement holds true for "reasonable" run lengths post initialization but pre-equilibrium. It holds true post-equilibrium as well except for m at or very near m c (where α c ≡ 2 m /N ), but in this region the number of steps to equilibrium is extremely large [5] ).
More specifically, for any given realization, a minority of agents outperform their strategies and the majority of other agents (some may also achieve net positive gain, if rarely). In the MG proper, however, τ is
